Forms of moral impossibility
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21603281 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Silvia Caprioglio Panizza (0000-0003-2184-028X, School of Philosophy University College Dublin Dublin 4 Ireland, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 361-373 |
| Publication date | 2022-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ejop.12651 |
| OpenAlex | W3138396389 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 9 |
An important yet often unacknowledged aspect of moral discourse is the phenomenon of moral impossibility, which challenges more widely accepted models of moral discussion and deliberation as a choice among possible options. Starting from observations of the new possibilities of anti‐immigrant attitudes and hate crimes which have been described by the press as something being “unleashed,” the paper asks what it means for something to enter or not the sphere of possibility in the moral sense, and whether it is ever desirable for something to remain or be pushed back outside the realm of the morally possible. Three forms of moral impossibility are identified: the unconceived, the unthinkable, and moral incapacity. Through the discussion of a stark fictional example of moral impossibility, the paper concludes that while the category of moral impossibility cannot settle disagreement, it sheds light on some of the most fundamental aspects of moral life
Deliberation · Epistemology · Impossibility · Moral authority · Moral disengagement · Phenomenon · Political science · Politics · Realm · Sociology · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |