On Being Bound to Linguistic Norms. Reply to Reinikainen and Kaluziński
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21604197 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Matthias Kiesselbach (Schlumberger (Ireland), corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 527-540 |
| Publication date | 2020-08-07 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Journal of Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0967-2559 • E-ISSN: 1466-4542 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09672559.2020.1782561 |
| OpenAlex | W3040803753 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 14 |
The question whether a constitutive linguistic norm can be prescriptive is central to the debate on the normativity of meaning. Recently, the author has attempted to defend an affirmative answer, pointing to how speakers sporadically invoke constitutive linguistic norms in the service of linguistic calibration. Such invocations are clearly prescriptive. However, they are only appropriate if the invoked norms are applicable to the addressed speaker. But that can only be the case if the speaker herself generally accepts them. This qualification has led critics to argue that if an addressed speaker’s acceptance is a necessary condition for legitimate prescriptions (and reproach for failure to adhere to them), then the account becomes unable to underwrite actual normativity. Moreover, critics argue, a danger of vicious circularity arises from the calibration account. This paper shows that once a vantage point within the calibration practice is accepted, the criticisms lose their force. It then explores why a theorist might reject such a perspective and suggests, as a plausible candidate, implicit Humean assumptions about the proper explanation of (linguistic) action. The paper ends by sketching a way forward for the debate on the normativity of meaning in light of this diagnosis
Epistemology · Linguistics · Sociology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Artificial Intelligence
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |