Meaning Still Not Normative
On Assessment and Guidance
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21604296 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jaakko Reinikainen (0000-0002-4409-4964, Tampere University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 510-526 |
| Publication date | 2020-08-07 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Journal of Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0967-2559 • E-ISSN: 1466-4542 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09672559.2020.1716824 |
| OpenAlex | W2999800678 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 11 |
Is meaning essentially normative, and what does claiming that amount to? One popular interpretation is that in virtue of their nature meanings are capable of guiding subjects in their applications of concepts, for meaning is constituted by norms. However, the guidance view has been met with criticism to the effect that if semantic norms constitute facts about meaning, then they cannot simultaneously guide subjects in their applications. In response, some normativist authors have proposed that the key sense of ‘normative’ in the claim that meaning is essentially normative is not ‘guidance’ but ‘assessment’. In this paper, I shall argue that switching from guidance to assessment offers no respite from the anti-normativist argument that normativity in the sense of prescriptivity emerges not from meaning as such but from the attitudes of subjects insofar as the normativist is unable to offer a plausible account of what makes assessment appropriate
Criticism · Epistemology · Linguistics · Normative · Political science · Virtue · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Medicine · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2020 - 2025 (6) |
| Highly cited | No |