Schelling’s Metametaphysical Critique of Hegel

Bibliographic Data

ID21604259
AuthorsMatthew J Delhey (0000-0001-8745-6761, University of Toronto, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume32
Issue5
Pages725-751
Publication date2024-10-19
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0967-2559 • E-ISSN: 1466-4542
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09672559.2024.2418619
OpenAlexW4404464264
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited21

This article defends Hegel against Schelling’s critique that his system can only comprehend actuality but cannot explain it. It does so while granting Schelling’s his basic premise, namely, that Hegel’s system is entirely logical. Hegel’s account of comprehension effectively answers Schelling’s ‘despairing’ question: why is there something rather than nothing? In the first part, I reconstruct Schelling’s critique, showing that he takes Hegel’s system to be entirely logical; as logical, a priori, and as a priori, unable to explain existence. In the second part, I advance a moderately deflationary reading of Hegel on which philosophy, as comprehending cognition, guarantees the non-vacuity of its categories by deriving them through conceptually transforming the universals of empirical science. Given its compellingness as a response to Schelling’s critique, this moderately deflationary reading warrants further development as an interpretation of Hegel’s thought

Epistemology · Hegelianism · Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Hegel · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Historical Thought

Tools

Open DOI