Hegel’s Metametaphysical Antirealism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21604309 |
|---|---|
| Authors | W Clark Wolf (0000-0001-8796-5750, St. John's College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 32 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 678-699 |
| Publication date | 2024-10-19 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Journal of Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0967-2559 • E-ISSN: 1466-4542 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09672559.2024.2427591 |
| OpenAlex | W4404756350 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 26 |
This essay defends a reading of Hegel as a metametaphysical antirealist. Metametaphysical antirealism is a denial that metaphysics has as its subject matter answers to theoretical questions about the mind-independent world. Hence, on this view, metaphysical questions are not, in principle, knowledge transcendent. I hold that Hegel presents a version of metaphysical antirealism in the Science of Logic because he pursues his project by suspending reference to all supposed objects of metaphysical theory as practiced before him. Hegel introduces reference in his theory only by the self-reference of thought to itself in the Doctrine of the Concept. I motivate the relevance of Hegel’s approach to metaphysics by comparing it to Kit Fine’s concept of ‘naïve metaphysics’. I argue that Hegel’s theory results from a comprehensively naïve metaphysics
Epistemology · Hegelianism · Linguistics · Critical Theory and Philosophy · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
Hegel and the Problem of Beginning
Critique of Pure Reason
Conjoining Meanings
The Philosophy of Philosophy
A Deflationary Approach to Hegel’s Metaphysics
Essays on Being
Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics
Hegel, a Collection of Critical Essays
Hegel’s Logic of Self-Predication
Hegel’s Dialectical Method
Hegel’s Foundation Free Metaphysics
Realism
Reason in the World
| Highly cited | No |
|---|