W Clark Wolf
Biographic Data
| ID | 8956078 |
|---|---|
| NAME | W Clark Wolf |
| GIVEN NAMES | W Clark |
| FAMILY NAME | Wolf |
| SIGNATURE | WOLF W C |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Massachusetts Amherst |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8796-5750 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1966 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Appearances as Representations
Kant frequently states that ‘appearances’ ( Erscheinungen ) are mere ‘representations’ ( Vorstellungen ), a claim we can call AR. AR is typically understood as a substantive thesis. This paper argues for a claim that has not been explored at length elsewhere: that AR is an analytic truth, so it does not imply phenomenalism and can be affirmed by a moderate realist reader. I argue that appearances are mental contents directed towards things. Hence…
Hegel’s Metametaphysical Antirealism
This essay defends a reading of Hegel as a metametaphysical antirealist. Metametaphysical antirealism is a denial that metaphysics has as its subject matter answers to theoretical questions about the mind-independent world. Hence, on this view, metaphysical questions are not, in principle, knowledge transcendent. I hold that Hegel presents a version of metaphysical antirealism in the Science of Logic because he pursues his project by suspending r…
Kant’s “in itself”
It is commonly assumed that the expression “an sich selbst” (“in itself”) in Kant combines with terms to form complex nouns such as “thing in itself” and “end in itself.” I argue that the basic use of “an sich selbst” in Kant’s German is as a sentence adverb , which has the role of modifying subject-predicate combinations, rather than either subject or predicate on their own. Expressions of the form “S is P an sich selbst” mean roughly that S is …
Husserl on the overlap of pure and empirical concepts
This essay clarifies Edmund Husserl's view of “pure” concepts, with a view to its contemporary metaphilosophical significance. It is argued that Husserl's conception of pure concepts is unique in that he allows overlap between pure and empirical concepts. This overlap leads to a potential for confusion between pure and empirical concepts which I label “amphiboly,” following Kant's use of the term. The essay begins by clarifying Husserl's view of …
What about non‐written figuring
No prominent works on this page.
What about non‐written figuring
Husserl on the overlap of pure and empirical concepts
This essay clarifies Edmund Husserl's view of “pure” concepts, with a view to its contemporary metaphilosophical significance. It is argued that Husserl's conception of pure concepts is unique in that he allows overlap between pure and empirical concepts. This overlap leads to a potential for confusion between pure and empirical concepts which I label “amphiboly,” following Kant's use of the term. The essay begins by clarifying Husserl's view of …
Kant’s “in itself”
It is commonly assumed that the expression “an sich selbst” (“in itself”) in Kant combines with terms to form complex nouns such as “thing in itself” and “end in itself.” I argue that the basic use of “an sich selbst” in Kant’s German is as a sentence adverb , which has the role of modifying subject-predicate combinations, rather than either subject or predicate on their own. Expressions of the form “S is P an sich selbst” mean roughly that S is …
Hegel’s Metametaphysical Antirealism
This essay defends a reading of Hegel as a metametaphysical antirealist. Metametaphysical antirealism is a denial that metaphysics has as its subject matter answers to theoretical questions about the mind-independent world. Hence, on this view, metaphysical questions are not, in principle, knowledge transcendent. I hold that Hegel presents a version of metaphysical antirealism in the Science of Logic because he pursues his project by suspending r…
Appearances as Representations
Kant frequently states that ‘appearances’ ( Erscheinungen ) are mere ‘representations’ ( Vorstellungen ), a claim we can call AR. AR is typically understood as a substantive thesis. This paper argues for a claim that has not been explored at length elsewhere: that AR is an analytic truth, so it does not imply phenomenalism and can be affirmed by a moderate realist reader. I argue that appearances are mental contents directed towards things. Hence…
Epistemology (3 works) · Linguistics (3 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Adverb (1 work) · Adverbial (1 work) · Art, Aesthetics, and Perception (1 work)