Frankfurt-Style Cases and Moral Responsibility

A Methodological Reflection

Bibliographic Data

ID21604312
AuthorsKoji Ota (0000-0003-4001-8566, Niigata University, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume29
Issue3
Pages295-319
Publication date2021-05-27
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0967-2559 • E-ISSN: 1466-4542
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09672559.2021.1924226
OpenAlexW3168295490
LanguageEN
References cited61

Frankfurt-Style Cases (FSCs) seem to elicit the intuitive judgment that an agent is morally responsible despite being unable to act otherwise, which is supposed to falsify the Principle of Alternative Possibility (PAP). Recent empirical studies have shown that the inclination toward this intuitive judgment is shared among people, which seems to reinforce the argument against the PAP. However, some scholars have argued for Descriptive Anti-Intuitionism (DAI) — intuitive judgments have never played an evidential role in philosophy — and thus denied the philosophical significance of such empirical findings. I point out that although DAI fails in its literal claim for FSCs, an associated insight remains potent: an intuitive judgment is so fragile that it can be easily defeated by further arguments. Nevertheless, I argue, empirical studies are significant in uncovering the general principles to which we are committed in our practice concerning moral responsibility. I clarify how such findings can play a robust evidential role in philosophical debates concerning moral responsibility by tracing the literature written by Frankfurt and philosophers

Empirical research · Epistemology · Intuitionism · Moral responsibility · Philosophy of science · Reflective equilibrium · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · War, Ethics, and Justification

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