Inferentialism, metacognition, and the limits of centering

Bibliographic Data

ID21689133
AuthorsIgor Douven (0000-0003-3413-080X, SND / CNRS/Sorbonne University, corresponding author), Shira Elqayam (0000-0003-4813-8597, De Montfort University), Nabil Hasshim (0000-0001-6375-8554, De Montfort University)
Year2025
Pages1-24
Publication date2025-09-30
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThinking & Reasoning (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1354-6783 • E-ISSN: 1464-0708
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13546783.2025.2559445
OpenAlexW4414659536
LanguageEN
References cited58

According to Inferentialism, a conditional is true precisely if there is a compelling argument for its consequent starting from its antecedent conjoined with contextually given background knowledge. As a direct consequence of this view, the truth of a conditional’s component parts does not guarantee the truth of the conditional, given that it is compatible with there not being an argument from the conditional’s antecedent to its consequent. Thus, Inferentialism invalidates the principle called Centering, according to which the joint truth of φ and ψ guarantees the truth of “If φ, ψ”. This distinguishes Inferentialism from all standard semantics of conditionals, all of which validate Centering. Here, we report the results from a study that registered (i) participants’ truth evaluations of a set of conditionals; (ii) their truth evaluations of the component parts of those conditionals; (iii) their judgements of the strength of the inferential connection between antecedent and consequent for each conditional; and (iv) their metacognitive confidence in the inference strength judgements. The data from (i)–(iii) allowed us to test Centering and to investigate whether possible violations of the principle can be explained in inferentialist terms. The data from (iv) allowed us to make some progress on testing predictions derived from Hypothetical Inferential Theory, the psychological face of Inferentialism. Our findings show that almost 60% of the relevant responses violated Centering; that participants obeyed Centering only when there was a strong inferential link between true antecedent and true consequent; and that the best models were those that involved inference strength and metacognitive confidence, while the Centering model was weak

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