Williamson on conditionals and testimony

Bibliographic Data

ID21370703
AuthorsKarolina Krzyżanowska (0000-0002-6424-8027, University of Amsterdam, corresponding author), Igor Douven (0000-0003-3413-080X, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
Year2023
Volume180
Issue1
Pages121-131
Publication date2023-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8116 • E-ISSN: 1573-0883
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11098-022-01874-7
PMID36691420
OpenAlexW4298109920
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited19

In Suppose and Tell , Williamson makes a new case for the material conditional account. He tries to explain away apparently countervailing data by arguing that these have been misinterpreted because researchers have overlooked the role of heuristics in the processing of conditionals. Cases involving the receipt of apparently conflicting conditionals play an important dialectical role in Williamson’s book: they are supposed to provide evidence for the material conditional account as well as for the defeasibility of a key procedure underlying our everyday assessments of conditionals. We argue that they can serve neither of these purposes and that Williamson overestimates the reach of heuristics. We specifically challenge Williamson’s assumption that, in the kind of cases centrally at issue in his book, the recipient of conflicting conditionals will typically accept those at face value, even granting Williamson that conditionals can be freely passed among speakers under normal conditions of testimony

Defeasible estate · Defeasible reasoning · Dialectic · Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Heuristics · Key (lock) · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Receipt · Value (mathematics) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access