Karolina Krzyżanowska
Biographic Data
| ID | 5995133 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Karolina Krzyżanowska |
| GIVEN NAMES | Karolina |
| FAMILY NAME | Krzyżanowska |
| SIGNATURE | KRZYŻANOWSKA K |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Amsterdam |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6424-8027 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Williamson on conditionals and testimony
In Suppose and Tell , Williamson makes a new case for the material conditional account. He tries to explain away apparently countervailing data by arguing that these have been misinterpreted because researchers have overlooked the role of heuristics in the processing of conditionals. Cases involving the receipt of apparently conflicting conditionals play an important dialectical role in Williamson’s book: they are supposed to provide evidence for…
The Prospects for a Monist Theory of Non-causal Explanation in Science and Mathematics
We explore the prospects of a monist account of explanation for both non-causal explanations in science and pure mathematics. Our starting point is the counterfactual theory of explanation (CTE) for explanations in science, as advocated in the recent literature on explanation. We argue that, despite the obvious differences between mathematical and scientific explanation, the CTE can be extended to cover both non-causal explanations in science and…
True clauses and false connections
Indicative conditionals—that is, sentences typically, though not exclusively, of the form “If p, (then) q,”—belong to the most puzzling phenomena of language. One of the puzzles that has recently attracted attention of psychologists of reasoning stems from the fact that on the majority of accounts of indicative conditionals, “If p, (then) q” can be true, or at least highly acceptable, even when there is no meaningful connection between p and q. C…
Conditionals and testimony
Conditionals and conditional reasoning have been a long-standing focus of research across a number of disciplines, ranging from psychology through linguistics to philosophy. But almost no work has concerned itself with the question of how hearing or reading a conditional changes our beliefs. Given that we acquire much-perhaps most-of what we believe through the testimony of others, the simple matter of acquiring conditionals via others' assertion…
What is wrong with false-link conditionals
It is a common intuition that the antecedent of an indicative conditional should have something to do with its consequent, that they should be somehow connected. In fact, many conditionals sound unacceptable precisely because they seem to suggest a connection which is not there. Although the majority of semantic theories of conditionals treat this phenomenon as something pragmatic, for instance, something that is conversationally implicated, no o…
Missing-link conditionals
According to virtually all major theories of conditionals, conditionals with a true antecedent and a true consequent are true. Yet conditionals whose antecedent and consequent have nothing to do with each other—so-called missing-link conditionals—strike us as odd, regardless of the truth values of their constituent clauses. Most theorists attribute this apparent oddness to pragmatics, but on a recent proposal, it rather betokens a semantic defect…
Belief ascription and the Ramsey test
Missing-link conditionals
According to virtually all major theories of conditionals, conditionals with a true antecedent and a true consequent are true. Yet conditionals whose antecedent and consequent have nothing to do with each other—so-called missing-link conditionals—strike us as odd, regardless of the truth values of their constituent clauses. Most theorists attribute this apparent oddness to pragmatics, but on a recent proposal, it rather betokens a semantic defect…
Belief ascription and the Ramsey test
Missing-link conditionals
According to virtually all major theories of conditionals, conditionals with a true antecedent and a true consequent are true. Yet conditionals whose antecedent and consequent have nothing to do with each other—so-called missing-link conditionals—strike us as odd, regardless of the truth values of their constituent clauses. Most theorists attribute this apparent oddness to pragmatics, but on a recent proposal, it rather betokens a semantic defect…
What is wrong with false-link conditionals
It is a common intuition that the antecedent of an indicative conditional should have something to do with its consequent, that they should be somehow connected. In fact, many conditionals sound unacceptable precisely because they seem to suggest a connection which is not there. Although the majority of semantic theories of conditionals treat this phenomenon as something pragmatic, for instance, something that is conversationally implicated, no o…
Conditionals and testimony
Conditionals and conditional reasoning have been a long-standing focus of research across a number of disciplines, ranging from psychology through linguistics to philosophy. But almost no work has concerned itself with the question of how hearing or reading a conditional changes our beliefs. Given that we acquire much-perhaps most-of what we believe through the testimony of others, the simple matter of acquiring conditionals via others' assertion…
True clauses and false connections
Indicative conditionals—that is, sentences typically, though not exclusively, of the form “If p, (then) q,”—belong to the most puzzling phenomena of language. One of the puzzles that has recently attracted attention of psychologists of reasoning stems from the fact that on the majority of accounts of indicative conditionals, “If p, (then) q” can be true, or at least highly acceptable, even when there is no meaningful connection between p and q. C…
The Prospects for a Monist Theory of Non-causal Explanation in Science and Mathematics
We explore the prospects of a monist account of explanation for both non-causal explanations in science and pure mathematics. Our starting point is the counterfactual theory of explanation (CTE) for explanations in science, as advocated in the recent literature on explanation. We argue that, despite the obvious differences between mathematical and scientific explanation, the CTE can be extended to cover both non-causal explanations in science and…
Williamson on conditionals and testimony
In Suppose and Tell , Williamson makes a new case for the material conditional account. He tries to explain away apparently countervailing data by arguing that these have been misinterpreted because researchers have overlooked the role of heuristics in the processing of conditionals. Cases involving the receipt of apparently conflicting conditionals play an important dialectical role in Williamson’s book: they are supposed to provide evidence for…
Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Linguistics (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Implicature (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Pragmatics (3 works)