Regulators and environmental groups
Better together or apart
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21691033 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ana Espinola-Arredondo (0000-0002-5983-9527, Washington State University), Eleni Stathopoulou (0000-0001-6543-3534, Nottingham Trent University), Félix Muñoz-García (0000-0001-6727-3618, Washington State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 40-66 |
| Publication date | 2022-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Environment and Development Economics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1355-770X • E-ISSN: 1469-4395 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s1355770x21000024 |
| OpenAlex | W3134064903 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 28 |
This paper examines green alliances between environmental groups (EGs) and polluting firms, which have become more common in the last decades, and analyzes how they affect policy design. We first show that the activities of regulators and EGs are strategic substitutes, giving rise to free-riding incentives on both agents. Nonetheless, the presence of the EG yields smaller welfare benefits when firms are subject to regulation than when they are not. In addition, the introduction of environmental policy yields large welfare gains when the EG is absent but small benefits when the EG is already present
Business · Economics · Environmental policy · Environmental regulation · Incentive · Market economy · Microeconomics · Natural resource economics · Public economics · Welfare · Climate Change Policy and Economics · Energy, Environment, Economic Growth · Environmental Sustainability in Business
Political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy
Environmental Policy and Technological Change
Environmentalism, democracy, and pollution control
NGOs and Corporations
The Industrial Organization of Private Politics
A Theory of Consumer Boycotts Under Symmetric Information and Imperfect Competition
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |