Self-Inflicted Frankfurt-Style Cases and Flickers of Freedom
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21700914 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael G Robinson (0000-0003-1962-2590, Chapman University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 553-575 |
| Publication date | 2024-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Ethics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1382-4554 • E-ISSN: 1572-8609 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10892-023-09464-3 |
| OpenAlex | W4388337150 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 33 |
According to the most popular versions of the flicker defense, Frankfurt-style cases fail to undermine the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) because agents in these cases are (directly) morally responsible not for making the decisions they make but for making these decisions on their own , which is something they could have avoided doing. Frankfurt defenders have primarily focused on trying to show that the alternative possibility of refraining from making the relevant decisions on their own is not a robust alternative, while generally granting that this alternative cannot easily be eliminated from successful cases of this sort. In a recent issue of this journal, Stockdale (2022) attempts to sidestep the debate concerning robustness and develops a novel kind of Frankfurt-style case in which agents are unable to avoid making the relevant decisions on their own. The fundamental problem with Stockdale’s argument is that it hinges on an implausible conception of acting on one’s own. I help clarify the pertinent sense of what it means to do a thing on one’s own in this context and show that these new cases are unable to overcome the targeted versions of the flicker defense of PAP
Epistemology · Law and economics · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · History · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification
Living without Free Will
Free Will and Luck
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility
Asymmetry in Judgments of Moral Blame and Praise
Alternative Possibilities and the Failure of the Counterexample Strategy
Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives
Soft Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style Scenarios
Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Acting on One’s Own
Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases
Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
The morality of action
Frankfurt on the principle of alternate possibilities
Bad is Stronger than Good
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |