The Division of Normativity and a Defence of Demanding Moral Theories

Bibliographic Data

ID21701640
AuthorsElizabeth Ventham (0000-0002-8759-5339, University of Liverpool, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume26
Issue1
Pages3-17
Publication date2023-03-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEthical Theory and Moral Practice (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1386-2820 • E-ISSN: 1572-8447
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10677-022-10320-w
OpenAlexW4308394119
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited18

Morality, according to some theories, demands a lot of us. One way to defend such demanding moral theories is through an appeal to the division of normativity; on this picture, morality is only one of the normative domains that guides us, so it should be expected that we often fail to follow that guidance. This paper defends the division of normativity as a response to demandingness objections against an alternative: moral rationalism. It does this by addressing and refuting three arguments: the argument from blameworthiness, the argument from agency, and the argument from authority. In turn, I show that none of these arguments work as responses to the division of normativity – if normativity generally is divided, so too must be blameworthiness, agency, and authority

Appeal · Epistemology · Moral agency · Morality · Normative · Political philosophy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Ethics in medical practice · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy