Rejection of Consequentialism

A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions

Bibliographic Data

ID6545001
AuthorsSamuel Scheffler (University of California, Berkeley)
Year1994
Pages206
Publication date1994-01-01
Open AccessNo
TypeBOOK
Reviewed byThe Rejection of Consequentialism, Stephen Darwall, 1984
VenueRejection of Consequentialism (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/0198235119.001.0001
ISBN9780198235118
Open LibraryOL28424310M
LanguageEN
Citations received281

The term ‘consequentialism’ refers to a class of moral theories that rank states of affairs from an impersonal standpoint and require agents to produce the best states of affairs they can. Many philosophers have criticized and rejected consequentialist theories, but Scheffler wishes to reconsider the rejection of consequentialism. He begins by discussing two objections to consequentialism, one having to do with the integrity of agents and the other with distributive justice. From there, he outlines a hybrid moral theory that avoids these two objections. Scheffler's hybrid theory agrees with consequentialism in so far as it always permits agents to produce the best states of affairs, but it departs from consequentialism by including an ‘agent‐centred prerogative’, allowing each agent to assign greater weight to his own interests than to those of others. Scheffler argues that this prerogative rests on a principled rationale—namely, that it is a rational strategy for taking into account the independence of the personal point of view. But this rationale does not support ‘agent‐centred restrictions’—norms that sometimes forbid agents from doing what would have the best outcome overall. Scheffler searches for, but does not find, a separate rationale for agent‐centred restrictions.

Ethics