Moral Disagreement and Moral Education
What’s the Problem
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21701664 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dominik Balg (0000-0003-2078-9312, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 5-24 |
| Publication date | 2024-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1386-2820 • E-ISSN: 1572-8447 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10677-023-10399-9 |
| OpenAlex | W4379468888 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 33 |
Although initially plausible, the view that moral education should aim at the transmission of moral knowledge has been subject to severe criticism. In this context, one particularly prominent line of argumentation rests on the empirical observation that moral questions are subject to widespread and robust disagreement. In this paper, I would like to discuss the implications of moral disagreement for the goals of moral education in more detail. I will start by laying out the empirical and philosophical assumptions behind the idea that widespread and robust moral disagreement undermines the prospects of transmitting moral knowledge in educational settings. Having thus provided a specific interpretation of the epistemic dynamics behind this so-called ‘challenge of disagreement’, I will proceed by discussing its didactical implications. More specifically, I will defend two claims: first, I will argue that the challenge of disagreement is not an effective challenge, because it undermines the possibility of knowledge transfer only with respect to a limited set of moral propositions. Second, I will argue that the challenge of disagreement is not a specific challenge, because the epistemically destructive effects of moral disagreement also pose a challenge for other prominent accounts of moral education that were originally proposed as promising alternatives to knowledge transmission accounts. If convincing, my arguments show that knowledge transmission accounts of moral education are in a much better position than is usually expected to incorporate the fact that moral questions are notoriously controversial
Argumentation theory · Criticism · Epistemology · Moral agency · Moral authority · Moral development · Moral disengagement · Moral psychology · Moral reasoning · Philosophy of medicine · Political science · Social cognitive theory of morality · Social intuitionism · Sociology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Ethics in medical practice · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
Toleranz – was müssen wir aushalten?
Moral Uncertainty
Context Dependence, Disagreement, and Predicates of Personal Taste
Philosophers on Philosophy
Reasonable Religious Disagreements
The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement
What do philosophers believe?
The Oxford handbook of philosophy of education
Applying Moral Caution in the Face of Disagreement
Ethics and Experts
Relying on Others
Moral Intuitions, Moral Expertise and Moral Reasoning 1
Towards a Theory of Moral Education
On “Epistemic Permissiveness”
Epistemic authority
Epistemology of Disagreement
A Theory of Moral Education
Disagreement as Evidence
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |