Moral testimony
Another Defense
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21735237 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Xuanpu Zhuang (0000-0003-4635-1925, Bowling Green State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 1-12 |
| Publication date | 2024-07-26 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Filosofia Unisinos (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1519-5023 • E-ISSN: 1984-8234 |
| Publisher | UNISINOS - Universidade do Vale do Rio Dos Sinos (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.4013/fsu.2024.252.08 |
| OpenAlex | W4401014629 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 16 |
According to some pessimists, trusting moral testimony is an action in which the agent does not think about moral questions by herself, and thus it is unacceptable. I argue for optimism by giving some reasons to display moral agents are still depending upon their own in many cases of moral testimony. Specifically, I argue that testimony is a form of social cooperation: the division of epistemic labor. My strategy is as follows: First, I give a principle to show when an agent could reasonably trust moral testimony. Specifically, an agent could reasonably accept the testimony, when she can reasonably expect she would make the same or similar judgment with the testifier. Second, I show how moral testimony could work as a form of social cooperation. Given the principle of the same judgment, it is reasonable for the agent to form a moral belief and act with moral testimony. And it provides us higher efficiency in moral knowledge and shows respect for each moral agent. After that, I provide explanations for the problem of moral disagreement and moral understanding with such a principle for moral testimony. Finally, I respond to some possible objections and give some clarifications of my argument
Epistemology · Moral authority · Moral disengagement · Moral psychology · Moral reasoning · Pessimism · Social cognitive theory of morality · Social intuitionism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement
Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology
In defense of moral testimony
I—Hallvard Lillehammer
Moral Deference, Moral Assertion, and Pragmatics
Why you cannot make people better by telling them what is good
The New Puzzle of Moral Deference
Can Testimony Transmit Understanding
Moral Testimony
Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge
What is Wrong With Moral Testimony
The Social Virtue Of Blind Deference
Moral Testimony Pessimism and the Uncertain Value of Authenticity
The epistemology of moral disagreement
Moral Deference and Deference to an Epistemic Peer
Moral Testimony
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |