The epistemology of moral disagreement

Bibliographic Data

ID4835262
AuthorsRach Cosker‐rowland (Australian Catholic University, corresponding author)
Year2017
Volume12
Issue2
Publication date2017-02-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12398
OpenAlexW2586209049
LanguageEN
Citations received16
References cited44

This article is about the implications of a conciliatory view about the epistemology of peer disagreement for our moral beliefs. Many have endorsed a conciliatory view about the epistemology of peer disagreement according to which if we find ourselves in a disagreement about some matter with another whom we should judge to be our epistemic peer on that matter, we must revise our judgment about that matter. This article focuses on three issues about the implications of conciliationism for our moral beliefs. The first is whether there is an asymmetry between the implications of conciliationism for the epistemic status of our moral beliefs and the implications of conciliationism for the epistemic status of our non-moral beliefs; for instance, some have argued that conciliationism leads to epistemological moral skepticism but not to epistemological nonmoral skepticism. The second is what the implications of conciliationism are for the epistemic status of particular moral beliefs. The third is whether conciliationism's impact on the epistemic status of our moral beliefs has practical implications

Epistemology · Moral disengagement · Moral psychology · Skepticism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Ethics in medical practice · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology

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