Bentham on Utility and Cultural Value

Bibliographic Data

ID21796259
AuthorsMalcolm Quinn (The University of Law, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume20
Publication date2021-01-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueRevue d’études benthamiennes (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1760-7507 • E-ISSN: 1760-7507
PublisherOpenEdition (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.4000/etudes-benthamiennes.9202
OpenAlexW4200326046
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited18

When examining the relevance of Bentham’s thinking to debates on cultural value, we should look, first of all, at the significance of utility as an independent ethical principle. Bentham finds the term ‘utility’ in the philosophy of David Hume, condemns Hume’s use of this term as ambiguous, and establishes utility as an independent ethical principle that is opposed to Hume’s preference for delicacy of sentiment and good taste. I argue that Hume is averse to the very thing that Bentham places at the centre of his ethics, namely a reckoning that we can all make with how pleasure shapes our sense of self. Bentham places us under an obligation to work out what our pleasures mean for us, how they situate us in the world, and how others will respond to what gives us the most pleasure. This working hypothesis on what gives each of us the most pleasure, must be conveyed in neutral, non-judgemental terms. Bentham espouses simple amusements, including games of push-pin and solitaire, as examples of how a recalculation of the possibilities for increasing pleasure and diminishing pain can take place, in defiance of cultural evaluations of what is ‘high’ and ‘low’. These distinctions of high and low culture are only one example of how definitions of culture affect the social organization of pleasure, within a broader conception of cultural value. Bentham asks whether definitions of cultural value are equitable and just, when seen in relation to the ethical aim of prolonging pleasure and diminishing pain. (249 words)

Economics · Statistics · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications

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