Are Mentalizing Systems Necessary? An Alternative Through Self–other Distinction
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21822977 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Masayuki Watanabe (0000-0002-8800-7260, Shiga University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 15 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 29-49 |
| Publication date | 2024-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Review of Philosophy and Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1878-5158 • E-ISSN: 1878-5166 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s13164-022-00656-8 |
| OpenAlex | W4294867680 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 107 |
Recent studies have identified two important findings on infants’ capability of taking others’ perspectives and the difficulty of ignoring perspectives irrelevant to the acquired perspective. Unfortunately, there is insufficient consensus on the interpretation of these phenomena. Two important features of perspective-taking, embodiment and aging, should be considered to reach a more appropriate hypothesis. In this paper, the mechanism of perspective-taking can be redefined through the well-known process of self–other distinction, which is inherent to humans, without resorting to either the assumption of controversial systems or an excessive reduction to executive functions. Therefore, it is hypothesized that the implicit mentalizing observed in infancy comes from the loosening phenomenon and lasts lifelong and that the self-representation separated from one’s own body by the detachment function is sent to other perspectives for explicit perspective-taking. This hypothesis can not only explain both the robustness of perspective-taking in the older adults and the appearance of egocentric/altercentric bias in adults but also is consistent with the findings in brain science and neuropathology. Finally, some issues to be considered are presented to improve the validity of this hypothesis
Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Mentalization · Metaphysics · Phenomenon · Philosophy of mind · Philosophy of science · Action Observation and Synchronization · Child and Animal Learning Development · Computer Science · Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior · Psychology · Social Psychology
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| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |