The Social Sense
Susceptibility to Others’ Beliefs in Human Infants and Adults
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23321768 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ágnes Melinda Kovács (0000-0003-3452-7727, Institute for Psychology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, H-1132 Budapest, Hungary., corresponding author), Ernő Téglás (0000-0003-4502-3639, Institute for Psychology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, H-1132 Budapest, Hungary.), Ansgar D Endre (0000-0003-4086-5167, Scuola Internazionale Superiore di Studi Avanzati), Ansgar Denis Endress (Cognitive Neuroscience Sector, International School for Advanced Studies (SISSA), I-34014 Trieste, Italy.) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 330 |
| Issue | 6012 |
| Pages | 1830-1834 |
| Publication date | 2010-12-24 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0036-8075 • E-ISSN: 0193-4511 |
| Publisher | American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1126/science.1190792 |
| PMID | 21205671 |
| OpenAlex | W1992793549 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 124 |
| References cited | 12 |
Mind Reading One core component of social cognition, especially of the kind practiced by humans, is the capacity to formulate a representation of what someone else believes to be true, even if that belief is not anchored in reality. Holding two such beliefs in mind—one false and one true—is no simple feat, and up until a few years ago, it was generally accepted that such a capacity did not arise until children were 3 to 4 years old. Since then, a flurry of studies, using a variety of interrogation measures, has suggested that much-younger humans might, in fact, possess this capacity, commonly referred to as a theory of mind. Kovács et al. (p. 1830 ) devised an ingenious behavioral paradigm and applied it both to adults and to infants, which suggests that the representations of others' beliefs are indeed formed in the same way in adults and in infants.
Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Developmental psychology · ENCODE · Object (grammar) · Social cognition · Task (project management) · Theory of mind · Artificial Intelligence · Child and Animal Learning Development · Computer Science · Face Recognition and Perception · Primate Behavior and Ecology · Psychology · Social Psychology
The ease and extent of recursive mindreading, across implicit and explicit tasks
The predator-avoidance effect
Challenging evolutionary psychology with the eternalist view of the world
Hope for syntactic bootstrapping
Reframing social cognition
Joint Action and Development
Is It Rational to Assume that Infants Imitate Rationally A Theoretical Analysis and Critique
A pirate goes nee-nor-nee-nor!” humor with siblings in middle childhood
Spontaneous belief attribution in younger siblings of children on the autism spectrum
History and Intentions in the Experience of Artworks
Mindshaping
Mind, Theories of
What Makes Us Social
The inherence heuristic
Parental Reflective Functioning
The cultural evolution of mind reading
Moral Judgment and Action in Preverbal Infants and Toddlers
How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind
Submentalizing
Mindreading in Infancy
At 6–9 months, human infants know the meanings of many common nouns
The role of metacognition in human social interactions
Mechanisms of Social Cognition
Social cognition in the we-mode
Spontaneous theory of mind in autism
Reading Patterns, Engagement Style and Theory of Mind
Solving the Puzzle about Early Belief‐Ascription
Does communication-based belief attribution in 18-month-olds reflect an altercentric bias?
The Perceptual Belief Problem
Seeing the World From Others’ Perspective
Core Intuitions of Psychological Non-Contradiction
Deafness, Hearing Loss and the Development of Mental State Reasoning Skills
Can 18-Month-Olds Revise Attributed Beliefs
Emerging Self-Representation Presents a Challenge When Perspectives Conflict
Children With Autism Spectrum Disorder Can Attribute False Beliefs in a Spontaneous-Response Preferential-Looking Task
The Situational Mental File Account of the False Belief Tasks
Interpretational Complexities in Developmental Research and a Piagetian Reading of the False-Belief Task
Are Mentalizing Systems Necessary? An Alternative Through Self–other Distinction
Talking About the Absent and the Abstract
What Do Theory-of-Mind Tasks Actually Measure? Theory and Practice
Social referencing processes in inclusive classrooms—Relationships between teachers' attitudes, students' attitudes, social integration and classroom climate
Tracking multiple perspectives
From monkeys to infants
In-between implicit and explicit
On the importance of infant carrying for social learning and the development of social cognition
Ontogenetic steps of understanding beliefs
The social roots of self development
Attentional orienting rather than spontaneous perspective taking
Objectivity, perceptual constancy, and teleology in young children
Pragmatics and epistemic vigilance
Altercentric bias in preverbal infants' encoding of object kind
Attention in naïve psychology
Do toddlers reason about other people's experiences of objects? A limit to early mental state reasoning
Vicarious representation
Naïve epistemics
How do non-human primates represent others' awareness of where objects are hidden
Evidence that altercentric biases in a continuous false belief task depend on highlighting the agent's belief
Flexible social monitoring as revealed by eye movements
Perspective taking as virtual navigation? Perceptual simulation of what others see reflects their location in space but not their gaze
Can infants adopt underspecified contents into attributed beliefs? Representational prerequisites of theory of mind
The Marvelous Gadget
Closeness impeded self-perspective inhibition whereas facilitated explicit perspective calculation
Effects of perspective taking on attention bias to body-related information among junior high school students with body image disturbance
Evaluation of Ken Wilber's Integral Psychology From a Scientific Perspective
Modeling self on others
On the Acquisition of Attitude Verbs
Profile of Prosocial Behaviors of Institutionalized Children at a School Yard
Group-based emotion in group processes and intergroup relations
Stimulated Variation and Cascades
The social mind
The pull of the group
Perceiving a story outside of conscious awareness
Principles of belief acquisition. How we read other minds
How from action-mirroring to intention-ascription
Direct social perception and dual process theories of mindreading
Opportunities and challenges for current developmental neuroscience
Authority matters
Theory and the Replication Problem
Testing “quarantined” metarepresentational accounts of Theory of Mind
Theory of Mind in Offending
A decade of theory of mind research on cayo santiago
Parallel paths and developmental Divides
Commentary on Ted Ruffman’s “Belief or not belief
Children, childhood, and development in evolutionary perspective
Understanding pretense as causal inference
The instability of sensitivity to false beliefs
To belief or not belief
Depression, trauma and mentalizing
Ostensive marking as a distinctive feature of human communication
Assertoric mindreading
Beyond Sight
Infants' Understanding of Preferences When Agents Make Inconsistent Choices
Month‐olds anticipate others’ actions based on their belief about an object's identity
Preverbal Infants' Ability to Encode the Outcome of Distributive Actions
The Influence of Maternal Socialization on Infants’ Social Evaluation in Two Cultures
Direct Reciprocity” or “Indirect Reciprocity” ‐ The Mechanisms of Infants’ Sharing Behavior
Anthropomorphizing Technology
Turvey’s Two Challenges and Ecological Values-Realizing Theory
Dynamic Resonance and Explicit Dialogic Engagement in Mandarin First Language Acquisition
Minimalism and Maximalism in the Study of Shared Intentional Action
Action Anticipation Through Attribution of False Belief by 2-Year-Olds
Two reasons to abandon the false belief task as a test of theory of mind
Goal attribution to inanimate agents by 6.5-month-old infants
Do 15-Month-Old Infants Understand False Beliefs?
Core mechanisms in ‘theory of mind’
Early bilingualism enhances mechanisms of false‐belief reasoning
Humans Have Evolved Specialized Skills of Social Cognition
Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?
Attribution of Beliefs by 13-Month-Old Infants
| Unique citing works | 124 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 8,27 |
| Citation span | 2011 - 2026 (16) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 115 |