Joint Action and Development
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3128653 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Stephen Butterfill (0000-0002-4283-6987, Department of Philosophy; University of Warwick, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 62 |
| Issue | 246 |
| Pages | 23-47 |
| Publication date | 2012-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.00005.x |
| OpenAlex | W2116051350 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 40 |
| References cited | 34 |
Given the premise that joint action plays some role in explaining how humans come to understand minds, what could joint action be? Not what a leading account, Michael Bratman's, says it is. For on that account engaging in joint action involves sharing intentions and sharing intentions requires much of the understanding of minds whose development is supposed to be explained by appeal to joint action. This paper therefore offers an account of a different kind of joint action, an account compatible with the premise about development. The new account is no replacement for the leading account; rather the accounts characterise two kinds of joint action. Where the kind of joint characterised by the leading account involves shared intentions, the new account characterises a kind of joint action involving shared goals
Action (physics) · Appeal · Epistemology · Joint (building) · Political science · Premise · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
Past materials, past minds
How to be minimalist about shared agency
The development of action planning in a joint action context
Liberalism and nationalism
Feminist critiques of liberalism
The conservative critique of liberalism
Public reason liberalism
The Cambridge Companion to Liberalism
Disturbances of Shared Intentionality in Schizophrenia and Autism
Shared Intentionality in Nonhuman Great Apes
Sartre on the responsibility of the individual in violent groups
Joint Interaction and Mutual Understanding in Social Robotics
Group navigation and procedural metacognition
Joint attention without recursive mindreading
Group identification, joint attention, and preferences
Varieties of collective action
Commitments and the sense of joint agency
Me or we? Action-outcome learning in synchronous joint action
An Embodied View on Collaboration in Early Childhood Education
Play's the Thing
Shared credit for shared success
Towards a Blueprint for a Social Animal
Joint Intentionality
Collective Intentionality, Individualism, and the Place of Children in Social Theorizing
A Dual Aspect Theory of Shared Intention
Joint Improvisation, Minimalism and Pluralism about Joint action
Time and sequence as key dimensions of joint action development
The psychology of cooperation
Telling as Joint Action
Social Ecological Context of Conversing
Minimalism and Maximalism in the Study of Shared Intentional Action
Intentional joint agency
Shared intentions, loose groups, and pooled knowledge
Interactive expertise in solo and joint musical performance
Understanding others by doing things together
Joint action without robust theory of mind
Doing things together
Shared Agency Without Shared Intention
Shared Goals and Development
Gricean Communication and Cognitive Development
Children Talk About The Mind
Knowledge and Lotteries
Teleological Explanations
Collective Intentions And Team Agency
False-belief understanding in infants
Psychological Research on Joint Action
A minimal architecture for joint action
The infant's theory of self-propelled objects
Cooperation and human cognition
Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age
Goal attribution to inanimate agents by 6.5-month-old infants
Teleological reasoning in infancy
What Makes Human Cognition Unique? From Individual to Shared to Collective Intentionality
Do 15-Month-Old Infants Understand False Beliefs?
Shared intentionality
Infants selectively encode the goal object of an actor's reach
The Social Sense
Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states?
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person
Understanding and sharing intentions
On the Construction of a Social Reality
Origins of Human Communication
Attribution of Beliefs by 13-Month-Old Infants
The Possibility of Practical Reason
Let’s Pretend
Rationality in Collective Action
Two Faces of Intention
Shared Cooperative Activity
Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments
Young children’s understanding of joint commitments
Structures of Agency
Walking Together
On Social Facts
Intentionality
| Unique citing works | 40 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,08 |
| Citation span | 2013 - 2026 (14) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 37 |