Understanding and sharing intentions

The origins of cultural cognition

Bibliographic Data

ID23312705
AuthorsM Tomasello (0000-0002-1649-088X, Max Planck Society, corresponding author), Malinda Carpenter (0000-0003-3983-2034, Max Planck Society, corresponding author), Josep Call (0000-0002-8597-8336, Max Planck Society, corresponding author), Tanya Behne (0000-0001-7649-4949, Max Planck Society, corresponding author), Hans Moll (0000-0002-9356-3077, Max Planck Society, corresponding author), Henrike Moll
Year2005
Volume28
Issue5
Pages675-691
Publication date2005-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueBehavioral and Brain Sciences (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0140-525X • E-ISSN: 1469-1825
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0140525x05000129
PMID16262930
OpenAlexW2106980598
LanguageEN
Citations received846
References cited131

We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: (1) the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and (2) a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The developmental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition.

Action (physics) · Autism · Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Construct (python library) · Developmental psychology · Dialogic · Epistemology · Intentionality · Joint attention · Reading (process) · Social cognition · Autism Spectrum Disorder Research · Child and Animal Learning Development · Primate Behavior and Ecology · Psychology · Social Psychology

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