Joint Intentionality
From Thin to Thick
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 2436482 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ladislav Koreň (0000-0002-7425-501X, Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 2 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 75-85 |
| Publication date | 2016-03-23 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Social Ontology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2196-9663 • E-ISSN: 2196-9655 |
| Publisher | Walter de Gruyter GmbH (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1515/jso-2015-0047 |
| OpenAlex | W3023357124 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 15 |
According to the shared intentionality hypothesis proposed by Michael Tomasello, two cognitive upgrades - joint and collective intentionality, respectively - make human thinking unique. Joint intentionality, in particular, is a mindset supposed to account for our early, species-specific capacity to participate in collaborative activities involving two (or a few) agents. In order to elucidate such activities and their proximate cognitive-motivational mechanism, Tomasello draws on philosophical accounts of shared intentionality. I argue that his deference to such cognitively demanding accounts of shared intentional activities is problematic if his theoretical ambition is in part to show that and how early (prelinguistic and precultural) capacities for joint action contribute to the development of higher cognitive capacities
Action (physics · Autism · Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Deference · Developmental psychology · Epistemology · Intentionality · Joint attention · Mechanism (biology · Metaphysics · Ostensive definition · Philosophy of mind · Action Observation and Synchronization · Child and Animal Learning Development · Language and cultural evolution · Neuroscience · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology
Chimpanzees know what conspecifics do and do not see
Cooperative Activities in Young Children and Chimpanzees
How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind
What Makes Human Cognition Unique? From Individual to Shared to Collective Intentionality
Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know?
On the Construction of a Social Reality
A Natural History of Human Thinking
Framing Joint Action
Shared Cooperative Activity
Walking Together
Joint Action and Development
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,25 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2022 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |