Ethics without theory? On advantages of the Pyrrhonian over the dogmatic way of life

The paper discusses two interrelated problems pertaining to the Pyrrhonian way of life. We try to rise to the challenge and play devil’s advocate, arguing from the skeptical point of view. The first part portrays a reconstruction of central skeptical arguments against the dogmatic ethics that attack some epistemological, metaphysical and ethical issues of the central dogmatic concept “the good by nature”. The second part considers the arguments suggested by G. Striker and R. Bett who claim that the sceptic cannot have ethics nor be an ethical agent. Against it, we try to formulate minimal conditions for ethics without theory, namely, the conceptual ability to distinguish between “right” and “wrong” actions grounded upon the notion of “private good” and the skeptical criteria for actions. This is made possible by relativizing the criteria of the ethical and connecting it with the customs and traditions of a given community. Though Pyrrhonism is quite different from ethical relativism or ethical realism, a striking comparison to H. Putnam’s ethical approach is drawn at the end of the paper

Epistemology · Ethical theory · Metaphysics · Realism · Relativism · Skepticism · Sociology · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Ethics in medical practice · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy

• Role Agrippových trópů v Sextových Πυρρωνείων ὑποτυπώσεων

  Open Access•Grigoris Vasiliadis•Aither•2025

  Add to list