Assessor Relative Conativism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21876372 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kristie Miller (0000-0002-5092-8419, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 96-115 |
| Publication date | 2024-03-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of the American Philosophical Association (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2053-4477 • E-ISSN: 2053-4485 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/apa.2022.35 |
| OpenAlex | W4295193526 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 11 |
According to conventionalist or conativist views about personal-identity, utterances of personal-identity sentences express propositions that are, in part, made true by the conative attitudes of relevant persons-stages. In this paper I introduce assessor relative conativism: the view that a personal-identity proposition can be true when evaluated at one person-stage's context and false when evaluated at another person-stage's context, because person-stages have different patterns of conative attitudes. I present several reasons to embrace assessor relative conativism over its more familiar realizer relative cousin
Aesthetics · Linguistics · Personal identity · Proposition · Self-concept · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · History · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology · Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Highly cited | No |