Judicial Populism and the Weberian Judge—The Strength of Judicial Resistance Against Governmental Influence in Hungary

Bibliographic Data

ID21971600
AuthorsMatyas Bencze (0000-0003-3234-0440, University of Debrecen, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume22
Issue7
Pages1282-1297
Publication date2021-10-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueGerman Law Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2071-8322 • E-ISSN: 2071-8322
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/glj.2021.67
OpenAlexW3210579010
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited2

The Hungarian judiciary has reacted to the political change of recent years in a twofold way. Some judges have resisted political pressure and decided cases according to the law and their conscience, while others, showing the signs of judicial populism, have deferred to the interests of the government. The paper explains the relationship between this twofold behavior and the bureaucratic tradition of the Hungarian justice system. The conclusion is that the bureaucratic model of organization has certain features that can make judges more resistant to political pressure, while other elements of the model can lead to judicial deference. Nonetheless, these latter elements are not necessary components of the ‘Weberian’ justice system

Bureaucracy · Deference · Economic Justice · Judicial activism · Judicial deference · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Populism · Sociology · European and International Law Studies · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law

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