How (Not) To Wrong Others with Our Thoughts

A Liberal Challenge Against the Possibility of Doxastic Wronging

Bibliographic Data

ID22109482
AuthorsChristine Bratu (0000-0001-9198-1251, University of Göttingen, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume9
Issue0
Publication date2023-07-17
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueErgo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2330-4014 • E-ISSN: 2330-4014
PublisherUniversity of Michigan Library (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.3998/ergo.3595
OpenAlexW4384521169
LanguageEN
References cited22

In recent years, a number of authors have claimed that we can wrong each other simply by having certain beliefs—in particular sexist, racist, ableist etc. beliefs—about each other. So far, those who argue for the possibility of so-called doxastic wronging have tried to defend this idea by focusing on issues of doxastic control and coordination. In this paper, I raise a distinctly moral challenge against the possibility of doxastic wronging. I show that the idea of doxastic wronging runs afoul of the liberal principle according to which all moral obligations have to be justifiable vis-à-vis those they presume to bind. In addition, I argue that there is a better way to account for the fundamental intuition driving the debate: instead of assuming the possibility of doxastic wronging and the morally grounded epistemic duty it implies, we should conceptualize what is morally problematic about bigoted beliefs in terms of the harm they constitute for their targets

Doxastic logic · Duty · Epistemology · Harm · Intuition · Premise · Theology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification

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