A Critique of Hobbes’s Mechanical Materialism and Its Principle of Motion

Bibliographic Data

ID22134151
AuthorsWeiqiang Qi (0009-0002-3650-9805, Zunyi Medical University, corresponding author)
Year2026
Volume11
Issue3
Pages89
Publication date2026-05-31
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2409-9287 • E-ISSN: 2409-9287
PublisherMDPI AG (PUBLISHER • IT)
DOI10.3390/philosophies11030089
OpenAlexW7163354170
LanguageEN
References cited18

This paper examines the essence and dilemmas of Hobbes’s mechanical materialism, which posits that all things—God, the soul, and the mind—are bodies subject to mechanical laws. Rejecting metaphysical assumptions, Hobbes emphasizes the absoluteness of bodies over appearances, insisting that all knowledge originates from sensory experience. A central issue in his philosophy is the nature of motion: if every movement requires an external cause, what initiates the first? While Hobbes dismisses the concept of a self-moved mover as incoherent, his appeal to agnostic theology introduces contradictions. To resolve this, he proposes the concept of endeavor (conatus) as the fundamental principle of motion, but it remains insufficient to explain motion’s origin fully. Nevertheless, Hobbes’s philosophical framework offers a materialist perspective for understanding the world, revealing how mechanical processes serve as the foundation for comprehending reality

Absoluteness · Appeal · Materialism · Metaphysics · Qualia · Historical Philosophy and Science · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access