A (Dis-)information Theory of Revealed and Unrevealed Preferences

Emerging Deception and Skepticism via Theory of Mind

Bibliographic Data

ID22157931
AuthorsNitay Alon (0000-0002-2698-3573, Hebrew University of Jerusalem), Lion Schulz (0000-0003-1841-1273, Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics), Jeffrey S Rosenschein (0000-0002-4042-9739, Hebrew University of Jerusalem), Peter Dayan (0000-0003-3476-1839, Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Year2023
Volume7
Pages608-624
Publication date2023-08-20
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueOpen MIND (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2470-2986 • E-ISSN: 2470-2986
PublisherMIT Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1162/opmi_a_00097
PMID37840764
OpenAlexW4385665817
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited57

In complex situations involving communication, agents might attempt to mask their intentions, exploiting Shannon’s theory of information as a theory of misinformation. Here, we introduce and analyze a simple multiagent reinforcement learning task where a buyer sends signals to a seller via its actions, and in which both agents are endowed with a recursive theory of mind. We show that this theory of mind, coupled with pure reward-maximization, gives rise to agents that selectively distort messages and become skeptical towards one another. Using information theory to analyze these interactions, we show how savvy buyers reduce mutual information between their preferences and actions, and how suspicious sellers learn to reinterpret or discard buyers’ signals in a strategic manner

Cognition · Cognitive science · Computer security · Deception · Economics · Epistemology · Information Theory · Maximization · Misinformation · Skepticism · Theory of mind · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Mathematics · Misinformation and Its Impacts · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology

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