Shared recycling model for waste electrical and electronic equipment based on the targeted responsibility system in the context of China
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 22235809 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tao Chu (0000-0002-4328-5312, Qingdao University), Jingai Ma (Xi'an Jiaotong University), Yongguang Zhong (Qingdao University, corresponding author), Hao Sun (0000-0002-4563-5363, Qingdao University), Weiqiang Jia (0000-0002-1377-7084, Nanchang Hangkong University) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 11 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Publication date | 2024-03-21 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Humanities and Social Sciences Communications (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2662-9992 • E-ISSN: 2662-9992 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1057/s41599-024-02901-0 |
| OpenAlex | W4393045302 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 73 |
The formal recycling of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) has long faced collection difficulties owing to the inadequate recycling system and insufficient collection capacity under China’s fund-based recycling model. The government has introduced the recycling Target Responsibility System (TRS) to motivate producers to develop and share recycling systems, yet without clear incentive mechanisms. In this study, we provide a “1 + N” shared recycling model referring to the theory of the sharing economy, and we propose a credit mechanism with a deposit system and a penalty mechanism for dishonesty to constrain the opportunistic behavior of sharing. In addition, according to the TRS, we design a “reduction-penalty-subsidy” fund policy to incentivize producers and recyclers to achieve recycling targets. On this basis, we apply evolutionary game theory and system dynamics approach to analyze the collaborative mechanism of shared recycling and the incentive effect of the funding policy. Game analysis yields the evolution of shared recycling from the developing stage to the mature stage. The system simulation results indicate that the government’s “penalty” and “subsidy” strategies provide evident incentives for producers and recyclers, respectively, in the developing stage, whereas endogenous dynamics derived from economies of scale under market mechanisms promote the multi-agent collaborative implementation of shared recycling in the mature stage
Business · China · Electrical engineering · Electronic equipment · Electronic waste · Extended producer responsibility · Geography · Political science · Waste management · Engineering · Extraction and Separation Processes · Recycling and Waste Management Techniques · Sustainable Supply Chain Management
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |