Agency and Morality
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 22367448 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Paulo Sousa (0000-0001-9502-6075, Queen's University Belfast), Christopher Manoharan (University of Connecticut) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Pages | 1-6 |
| Publication date | 2018-09-05 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | OTHER |
| Venue | The International Encyclopedia of Anthropology (JOURNAL) |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1002/9781118924396.wbiea1782 |
| OpenAlex | W2610956091 |
| ISBN | 9781118924396 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 10 |
Cognitive traditions study how human beings utilize naive concepts of agency and morality to make judgments about persons and their actions and how these concepts and judgments are related. We discuss, in particular, how judgments of whether an action is intentional or not affect judgments of moral blame and moral wrongdoing. Cognitive approaches argue that judgments of intentionality constitute a fundamental factor in how humans calculate a person's degree of blame for the occurrence of a bad event, even if some anthropologists have claimed that in many cultural contexts people leave aside questions of intentionality, adhering to a criterion of strict or absolute liability. However, cognitive approaches argue that judgments of intentionality constitute a much less important factor in how humans categorize an action as an instance of wrongdoing (i.e., as a normative transgression), since ordinary norms prohibiting an action often do not specify anything about intentionality
Aside · Blame · Categorization · Cognition · Criminology · Culpability · Epistemology · Intentionality · Moral agency · Morality · Normative · Wrongdoing · Cultural Differences and Values · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |