Legal moralism revised

This article explores how disciplinary sanctions imposed on legal professionals can be given a coherent moral justification. Drawing inspiration from the philosophy of criminal law, it develops a modified form of legal moralism based on role morality rather than common morality. The theory is intended to provide disciplinary authorities with normative guidance on what may legitimately be defined as a disciplinary offence, as well as limits on what must not be classified as such. Four challenges that any plausible version of legal moralism must meet are identified and addressed. The article argues that legal moralism, traditionally grounded in a deontological conception of morality, can be coherently connected with consequentialist reasoning, represented here by utilitarianism. Utilitarianism can serve as its ultimate justification. Furthermore, the paper proposes a version of legal moralism that rests on a consequentialist conception of morality. In this case, however, utilitarians have little reason to prefer such an approach over the direct application of the principle of utility. The article concludes that legal moralism, properly reconstructed, provides a philosophically robust foundation for understanding and justifying disciplinary sanctions.

Discipline · Legal Ethics · Legal profession · Morality · Sanctions · Ethics and Legal Issues in Pediatric Healthcare · Legal Education and Practice Innovations · Medical Malpractice and Liability Issues