An experimental investigation of the calculus of consent

Bibliographic Data

ID22434950
AuthorsAdam Hoffer (Tax Foundation, USA), M Scott Niederjohn (0000-0002-2292-8585, Concordia University Wisconsin)
Year2026
Volume41
Issue1
Pages78-101
Publication date2026-04-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Public Finance and Public Choice (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2515-6918 • E-ISSN: 2515-6926
PublisherBristol University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1332/25156918y2025d000000025
OpenAlexW4411443528
LanguageEN
References cited13

We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate group decision-making, inspired by a model from Buchanan and Tullock’s The Calculus of Consent . Unlike previous researchers, we move beyond simple majority and unanimity rules, allowing groups to choose voting rules endogenously. The results of our experiment are consistent with the Buchanan–Tullock model. In particular, we confirm a tendency toward less restrictive voting rules when decision-making costs are high and external costs are low. We also find that less restrictive voting rules lead to higher group profits.

Cardinal voting systems · Economics · Epistemology · Majority rule · Mathematical economics · Operations research · Political science · Unanimity · Voting · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Mathematics · Medicine · Philosophy · Artificial Intelligence

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