Why Spirit is the Natural Ally of Reason

Spirit, Reason, and the Fine in Plato’s Republic

Bibliographic Data

ID23150262
AuthorsRachel Singpurwalla (corresponding author)
Year2013
Pages41-66
Publication date2013-06-27
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenueOxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume 44 (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199677887.003.0002
OpenAlexW2554564215
ISBN9780199677887
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited6

In the Republic, Socrates claims that the soul has three distinct parts or elements, each an independent source of motivation: reason, spirit, and appetite. While Socrates’ characterization of the reasoning and appetitive parts is fairly clear and intuitive, his conception of the spirited part is notoriously obscure. Recently, however, a consensus has emerged regarding we should understand the spirited part: the spirited part aims to be fine and honorable, where its conception of what it is to be fine and honorable is determined by social norms. This paper argues against this prevalent interpretation and offers a new account. While it is correct to hold that spirit aims to be fine and honorable, it is not the case that the individual’s conception of what it is to be fine and honorable is determined by social norms. Instead, there is a fact of the matter about what it is to be fine and honorable and it is this fact that shapes the individual’s conception. The present account explains Socrates’ puzzling claims that (i) spirit is the natural ally of reason, (ii) being ruled by spirit is second-best, and (iii) physical training educates the spirited part of the soul.

Aesthetics · Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy) · Natural (archaeology) · SOCRATES · Soul · The Republic · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Ethics in medical practice · History · Philosophy · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought

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