The Struggle with(in) Leontius’ Soul

Bibliographic Data

ID21291569
AuthorsEduardo Saldaña (Université de Genève Département de philosophie Rue de Candolle 2 Geneva 1211 CH, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume103
Issue1
Pages1-28
Publication date2021-03-26
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueArchiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0003-9101 • E-ISSN: 0943-3988
PublisherWalter de Gruyter GmbH (PUBLISHER • DE)
DOI10.1515/agph-2017-0118
OpenAlexW3094848697
LanguageEN
References cited31

In Republic 4, Plato’s Socrates argues that there are three elements in the soul: the rational, the spirited, and the appetitive. This paper focuses on the argument distinguishing spirit from appetite in the story of Leontius. I shall argue that the rational element first opposes Leontius’ appetite and, when appetite overpowers reason, then Leontius’ spirited part opposes the appetitive. Consequently, there is a kind of disgust that would be appropriately characterized as rational; and, drawing on this consequence, I suggest that the primary target of early ethical education is the rational element of the soul

Anger · Appetite · Argument (complex analysis) · Disgust · Element (criminal law) · Epistemology · Political science · SOCRATES · Soul · Classical Antiquity Studies · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Endocrinology · Historical, Religious, and Philosophical Studies · Law · Medicine · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology

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