The validity of disjunctive syllogism is not so easily proved.
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23156159 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Chris Mortensen (Cambia, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1983 |
| Volume | 24 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Publication date | 1983-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0029-4527 • E-ISSN: 1939-0726 |
| Publisher | Duke University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1305/ndjfl/1093870218 |
| OpenAlex | W2061744175 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
This note is prompted by John Burgess's "Relevance: A Fallacy?" The kind of argument he gives is not so unusual, and can be encountered around the literature (e.g., [3], p. 666) and not infrequently in the verbal pronouncements of philosophers. The bones of the reply I will give to Burgess can also be found in a number of places and as long ago as 1972 (e.g., [4]-[6]), though I do not think it has been systematically developed anywhere. Since Burgess's argument is representative of a widespread kind of mistake about relevant logics, it is worthwhile to try to say clearly what is wrong with it.
Epistemology · Syllogism · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.12 |
| Citation span | 1983 - 2025 (43) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |