On What There Really Is to Our Notion of Ownership of a Thought

Bibliographic Data

ID23157309
AuthorsAnnalisa Coliva (0000-0001-6258-5276, corresponding author)
Year2002
Volume9
Issue1
Pages41-46
Publication date2002-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy, psychiatry & psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1071-6076 • E-ISSN: 1086-3303
PublisherProject MUSE (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1353/ppp.2003.0005
OpenAlexW2085001992
LanguageEN
Citations received8

JOHN CAMPBELL'S REPLY to my paper aims at reestablishing the point that there are two strands to our notion of ownership of a thought. There are two ways of cashing out this idea. 1 First, one could say that A is the owner of a thought if and only if both the following two independent conditions apply 2 : (1) X is introspectively aware of a token thought and (2) X is the person who formed that token thought. Second, one may hold that there are twodifferent and independent notions of ownership of a thought, call it O1 and O2, corresponding to (1) and (2), respectively. For brevity, I will refer only to the first interpretation. But what I will be saying will apply, mutatis mutandis, to both.

Computer security · Economics · Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy) · Law and economics · Linguistics · Point (geometry) · Positive economics · Security token · Sociology · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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