Fitting Attitudes, Finkish Goods, and Value Appearances

Datos Bibliográficos

ID23159374
AutoresGraham Oddie (0000-0002-9934-246X, autor de correspondencia)
Año2016
Páginas74-101
Fecha de publicación2016-09-08
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoCHAPTER
RevistaOxford Studies in Metaethics 11 (SOURCE_BOOK)
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198784647.003.0004
OpenAlexW2521224812
ISBN9780198784647
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas4

According to Fitting Attitude theorists, for something to possess a certain value it is necessary and sufficient that it be fitting (appropriate, or good, or obligatory, or something) to take a certain attitude to the bearer of that value. The idea seems obvious for thick evaluative attributes, but less obvious for the thin evaluative attributesâ like goodness, betterness, and degrees of value. This paper is an extended argument for the thesis that the fitting response to the thin evaluative attributes of states is desire, broadly construed. The good is what it is fitting to desire, the bad what it is fitting to be averse to, and the better what it is fitting to prefer. I start with two prominent challenges to the FA schema (Wrong Kinds of Reasons and Solitary Goods). For the FA schema to survive these challengesâ along with some developments of themâ the fitting response to the goodness of a state has to be a non-factive, non-doxastic representation of the state as goodâ in other words, an appearance of the goodness that state. That desires and preferences are non-doxastic value appearances is independently attractive, and I argue that this is in fact the simplest hypothesis compatible with the Fitting Attitude approach.Fitting Attitudes

Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Goodness of fit · Machine learning · Political science · Representation (politics) · Schema (genetic algorithms) · Statistics · Value (mathematics) · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Computer Science · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Mathematics · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology