Incoherence and Irrationality

Bibliographic Data

ID23170707
AuthorsDonald Davidson (corresponding author)
Year2004
Pages189-198
Publication date2004-03-25
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenueProblems of rationality (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherOxford University PressOxford (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/0198237545.003.0012
OpenAlexW4245882949
ISBN9780198237549
LanguageEN
Citations received8

Continues the theme of the preceding chapter, inquiring further into the possibility of irrational thought and action, judged against a background that stipulates large‐scale rationality as a necessary condition for both interpretability and possession of a mind. Argues that, in order to remove the paradoxes of irrationality, it is not necessary to regard judgements of irrationality as subjective; rather, a more holistic approach, which holds that irrationality is made possible by the fact that agents cannot fail to comport most of the time with the basic norms of rationality, is required. Furthermore, the view of the mind that makes synchronic inconsistency seem paradoxical, namely, one that implies that all beliefs, desires, intentions, and principles of the agent that creates the inconsistency are present and in operation at once, does not seem to be tenable.

Action (physics) · Economics · Epistemology · Interpretability · Irrational number · Irrationality · Order (exchange) · Positive economics · Possession (linguistics) · Rationality · Theme (computing) · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Mathematics · Philosophy · Psychology

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