Language and Experience

Bibliographic Data

ID23185683
AuthorsIlham Dilman (corresponding author)
Year1984
Pages106-122
Publication date1984-01-01
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenueQuine on Ontology, Necessity and Experience (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherPalgrave Macmillan UK (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/978-1-349-06821-0_6
OpenAlexW2475661928
ISBN9781349068210
LanguageEN
Citations received22

Quine's critique of empiricism consists of his critique of what he calls 'the two dogmas of empiricism'. We have considered his critique of 'the first dogma', namely the distinction between necessary and contingent truths, and we found that it is no dogma, i.e. that this distinction is not spurious. Furthermore it is not the exclusive property of empiricism. What is so is the analytic view of necessary truths. For that view implies the rejection of the possibility of de re necessities and of any a priori knowledge of nature. Such a possibility is clearly incompatible with empiricism, and empiricism is right to want to reject it. But what it puts in its place is inadequate. So Quine is right to criticise it. However he, in his turn, is wrong to reject the distinction between necessary and contingent truths as spurious.KeywordsPhysical ObjectConceptual SchemeSense ExperienceBackground LanguageLogical PositivistThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

A priori and a posteriori · Empiricism · Epistemology · Property (philosophy) · Quine · Spurious relationship · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Historical Linguistics and Language Studies · Philosophy · Philosophy, Science, and History

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