Going Through Aporiai
The Critical Use of Aristotle’s Dialectic
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23196431 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gabriela Rossi (0000-0002-0541-9877, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Publication date | 2017-09-21 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume 52 (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/oso/9780198805762.003.0006 |
| OpenAlex | W3176722869 |
| ISBN | 9780198805762 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
This paper challenges a widespread reading of Aristotle’s use of dialectic in the treatment of aporiai . According to this reading, the search for a resolution of an aporia is supposed to proceed by arguing against conflicting theses to refute one of them. I argue that this reading is not satisfactory and propose an alternative, based on an often overlooked distinction between two dialectical procedures, the refutation ( elenchos ) of a thesis and the resolution ( lusis ) of an argument. These two terms are employed fairly consistently by Aristotle in the treatises as well. Since an aporia requires not merely conflicting theses, but conflicting arguments for those theses, I contend that the ideal way out of aporiai involves a critical analysis of those arguments, akin to that involved in the dialectical resolution. A relevant implication of this reading is that it expands the critical use of dialectic for philosophy, and points to the specific philosophical utility of the Sophistical Refutations.
Argument (complex analysis) · Dialectic · Epistemology · Linguistics · Reading (process) · Chemistry · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophy · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought
| Citations per year | 0.6 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2025 (5) |
| Highly cited | No |