Exalting the Meek Virtue of Humility in Aquinas

‘Augustine says that “almost the whole of Christian teaching is humility.” ’ There is an abundance of writing in the past decade or so about humility in Thomas Aquinas' name.2 According to one interpreter, Shawn Floyd, Thomas' writing is so fecund exactly because he ‘provides one of the most thorough accounts of humility one can find within the Christian tradition.’3 The consensus seems to be that Thomas' thorough account of humility proves useful because it remains relevant. Humility appears an anti-modern virtue that can help us address the problems of the post-modern age. A recent piece setting out on this note appears in the annals of this journal in 2012: Catherine Hudak Klancer's ‘How Opposites (Should) Attract: Humility as a Virtue for the Strong.’4 Klancer counters present-day attitudes toward humility with a ressourcement of Thomas Aquinas and, fascinatingly, Zhu Xi. Aquinas' and Xi's shared judgments emphasize the crucial importance of humility for a flourishing common and political life, as relevant to the 12th and 13th centuries as to contemporary democracy. magnanimity and humility are two sides of one coin, two complementary perspectives, from above and below, of the will to embrace and pursue a true vision of what it is to be human, based upon a true understanding of our final end ... This claim, brought out in Thomas' treatment of these virtues, illuminates the landscape of modernity and perhaps points to the root of the modern malaise ... the odd juxtaposition of exaggerated pride and exaggerated humility, of presumption and pusillanimity hand in hand.6 As bountiful and thought-provoking as this writing is, it can distract readers of Thomas from a more conspicuous problem. The problem is this: Thomas did not have much to say about humility. Out of the 512 questions of his incomplete Summa Theologiae, he devoted only one to the topic. Thomas gives short shrift to humility. This small irony frames my initial approach to humility. I describe how, given the structure and ordering of the Summa, Thomas' treatment of humility is actually too modest (Section I). This critique might give the impression that Thomas is unhelpful when it comes to humility. I think this, too, is a mistake. What little Thomas does say in the Summa is helpful insofar as he provides the seeds for a more robust account of humility. In this essay I merely experiment with what a more robust ‘Thomistic account’ might look like. I follow a twofold approach to Thomas by imagining how he might have maintained the scheme of the Summa while properly emphasizing the place of humility in the Christian life (Section II) and by suggesting how Thomas' thin account of humility in the Summa can also be developed further by tending to other writings by Thomas (Section III). These efforts should interest contemporary interpreters because it seems they are trying to retrieve a ‘Thomistic account’ of humility that is in fact not in Thomas' Summa. This article is an overture to an extended account of humility in the Thomistic vein that applauds the efforts of these contemporary interpreters while offering a few modest corrections. It makes sense to begin with the placement of Thomas' single question on humility within the twenty-eight questions on temperance in the Summa's Secunda Secundae. Temperance's integral part includes the virtue of honesty. Temperance's subjective parts concern the pleasures of food and the flesh. And temperance has four potential parts, which are virtues directed toward certain secondary acts or matters, ‘not having, as it were, the whole power of the principal virtue’ of temperance (ST 2a2ae q48 a1). These potential parts include continence, clemency, meekness, and modesty. Finally, Thomas writes that modesty is a virtue that ‘differs from temperance, in that temperance moderates those matters where restraining is most difficult, while modesty moderates those that present less difficulty’ (ST 2a2ae q160 a2 co). Modesty moderates lesser matters where moderation is not so difficult. Modesty includes four kinds of moderation: (i) studiousness, which moderates the desire of things pertaining to knowledge, (ii) modesty in exterior movements, which moderates bodily movements and actions, and (iii) modesty in outward apparel, which moderates dress and (iv) humility, which moderates ‘the movement of the mind towards some excellence’ (ST 2a2ae q160 a2). This is the overall structure within which we find humility: as a merely potential part of temperance (not having the whole power of temperance itself) under the subordinate virtue of modesty (which moderates matters that ‘present [even] less difficulty’ than temperance) which requires that humility simply tempers movements of the mind (lest it tends to high things immoderately rather than the alternative of strengthening good activity) (ST 2a2ae q161 a1). To put this more concretely, this account of humility oddly suggests that disciplining our bodily desires and pleasures (abstinence, sobriety, and chastity) is easier than exercising simple humility. This magnificent reversal of expectations means that humility suffers a lowly place in the Thomistic hierarchy. Humility is a virtue of the concupiscible appetite, not of reason. Humility regulates one's interior disposition – it does not contribute directly to the common good. It moderates and restrains activity – it does not strengthen and encourage activity like magnanimity does. Since it is less excellent than the theological virtues, humility does not have the last end as its object. is not without its drawbacks, for it does not always allot to the specifically Christian virtues the place they deserve. This is the case, for example, with humility, which is practically nonexistent in the lists used and is connected with modesty in Cicero's list, which is itself a part of temperance. Humility thus receives an overly modest position, which is understandable among pagan authors, but St. Thomas knows perfectly well its importance in Christian tradition.10 Thomas comes closer to the tradition – namely he relies upon and develops it – in his actual treatment of humility. He acknowledges the centrality of this virtue in Scripture and tradition. Within this one question Thomas cites a host of sources: Sirach, Isaiah, the Psalms, the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, 1 Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, James, Origen, Augustine, John Chrysostom, Gregory the Great, Benedict ... In light of this great cloud of witnesses, I don't fault Thomas for the content of his treatment of humility. Rather I wonder about its form. The form within which Thomas develops humility requires that it remain – even as a preeminent virtue in the Christian life – ‘overly modest.’11 Thomas' form denies the specifically Christian virtue of humility the place it deserves.12 Although Scripture and tradition provide a common witness that prioritizes humility, Thomas allows this priority to be eclipsed through his reliance on philosophical ordering principles. We know that Pincakers is right about this formal problem in Thomas precisely because so few Thomists have written on humility. And perhaps the reason that so few Thomists have written on humility over the past several centuries is not because they are bad Thomists, but precisely because they are good ones. They are ‘good’ in the sense that they follow Thomas' lead. Namely, they don't write much about it. Hence there is an overabundance of Thomistic tomes on charity, prudence, justice, fortitude – and few – and, if I am not mistaken, just one tome on humility.13 In sum, the many contemporary appropriations mentioned at the outset of this article seem to be at fault by their overly charitable reading of Thomas – a fault that is not all bad! These contemporary interpretations are faithful to the common witness of Christian tradition, but unfaithful to Thomas. They conceive Thomas' treatment in the Summa as more faithful to the tradition than he is. They read Thomas as having worked out a difficulty that he never quite overcame – the difficulty of how to allow philosophical ordering principles to structure a discussion without letting them constrain his theological subject matter. In sum, these contemporary interpreters display exactly how interesting humility is, but effectively sidestep the difficulties that also make humility in Thomas problematic. Humility is interesting and problematic because, according to my argument thus far, Thomas is aware of the importance of this Christian virtue and yet de-emphasizes it in his most mature moral teaching. If it is true that Thomas' treatment of humility in the Summa generates a ‘problem,’ then how might it be solved? One potential answer strikes me as immodest. For humility's sake I suggest it: Thomas ought to have exalted humility in the Summa to a higher place among the virtues. Thomas orders the 189 questions of the Secunda Secundae (of which humility is Question 161) first according to the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity) and then according to the moral virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance). This order is striking when juxtaposed with the order he gives to the virtues in the Prima Secundae. Yet neither ordering reflects how we receive or develop the virtues. Of course the theological virtues are of first importance in the Christian life, and charity even influences the ‘form’ of the moral virtues to yield Thomas' fascinating (and potentially problematic) category of infused moral virtues.14 ‘That charity is the form of all the virtues,’ Stanley Hauerwas explains, ‘means therefore how-we-do-what-we-do makes all the difference for how what-we-do makes us virtuous.’15 As Thomas shifts in the Secunda Secundae from the theological virtues (QQ1–46) to the moral virtues (QQ47–170), he reveals an integrated moral organism – the body of moral teaching animated by its theological soul.16 At the same time, Thomas' manner of proceeding is indebted to philosophy which makes it incongruous with his object of inquiry. His coursing first through prudence, then justice, then fortitude, and finally temperance is ordered according to the traditional philosophical hierarchical ordering of human powers that are the subject of virtue: the intellect (prudence), the rational appetite (justice), and the sense appetites (fortitude, temperance). Earlier I mentioned that Thomas places humility under the last and the least virtue: temperance. ‘Temperance, which denotes a kind of moderation,’ Thomas explains, ‘is chiefly concerned with those passions that tend towards sensible goods, viz. desire and pleasure’ (ST 2a2ae q141 a3 co). These passions can pull us in a number of destructive directions – either in immoderate pursuit of the sensible and bodily good, or in unreasonable flight from sensible and bodily evils. The sum effect of temperance is to safeguard the good of reason by moderating these passions. As the Philosopher declares (Ethic. I.2) ‘the good of the many is more godlike than the good of the individual,’ wherefore the more a virtue regards the good of the many, the better it is. Now justice and fortitude regard the good of the many more than temperance does, since justice regards the relations between one man and another, while fortitude regards dangers of battle which are endured for the common weal: whereas temperance moderates only the desires and pleasures which affect man himself. Hence it is evident that justice and fortitude are more excellent virtues than temperance: while prudence and the theological virtues are more excellent still. (ST 2a2ae q141 a8 co) There is more. I already outlined how humility assumes the last and least place under temperance – whereas virtues such as shamefacedness and honesty are integral parts of temperance, and sobriety and chastity are subjective parts, humility is merely a potential part.19 ‘Merely’ because it does not even have the full power of temperance. What is important to grasp is this: whereas temperance ‘brings moderation into those things wherein it is most difficult to be moderate,’ humility falls under ‘another virtue about matters of lesser import’ to help ‘moderate other lesser matters where moderation is not so difficult’ (ST 2a2ae q160 a1 co). In sum, the Thomistic hierarchy does not extol the virtue of humility. Yet the substance of Thomas' thought on humility may help question this problematic hierarchy. This is the first clue for how to better prioritize humility within his existing scheme of the virtues. We must not only revere God in Himself, but also that which is His in each one, although not with the same measure of reverence as we revere we should subject with humility to all our for according to 1 subject ... to human for but to God we the of (ST 2a2ae q161 a3 within us to and them better than This is humility. within our us to think little of This too is Humility is in Thomas' account because of his theological on and over into our with and even Thomas' writing on humility in the Summa also itself to by its to the virtue of This is the clue for humility: humility with in a more excellent part of the than temperance. from and to the good with to our and justice comes many virtues – (ST 2a2ae and (ST 2a2ae seem to humility within their Humility is the of a Thomas that God we he humility into the of (ST 2a2ae q161 a3 His that the that he the acts of (and many under as a potential part of It is a part of justice because justice in itself another, or his or is merely a potential part because it falls short of justice – we can never give God His that humility is a potential part of a but for the reason. Humility falls short of temperance because it falls short of justice because it Thomas the of virtues to a must be first the of the Thomas is that humility is the of the in us and to the of (ST 2a2ae q161 the virtues connected to seems to pull into a single movement of our to God through and In emphasizing their Thomas these virtues as – as Thomas' treatment of justice is because he includes within this treatment a of as a is like justice because it (i) is directed toward and (ii) what is (ST 2a2ae falls short of the of This is because it is not a but rather a moral one out of one man a of the (ST 2a2ae Thomas that man can be to be on account of and all of his virtues – for his virtues that his life its and measure in with the Thomas that the of our most our with God and therefore a life in and in the of God in and charity the of God in If we what our has of above that which we have of our we a on better than must not by to but we should in think it for to have that is to us and he is better than we although our good we are better than be not (ST 2a2ae q161 a3 It is without to and the most of ... one may and in all and in of one's so as to all one's to according to that we are to think of as of but our is from (ST 2a2ae q161 Thomas' account of and his account of Thomas that we can only through help in He that we can exalted in only through in he is to humility to at things through in one's but to at things through in is not to since the more one to the more is one exalted in (ST 2a2ae q161 a2 This is yet of how humility is through a with God – in the that our good activity is upon overall is to suggest a better placement of humility in Thomas' scheme of the virtues in the Summa. The first two seem to This clue of how humility can be closer to justice with the which Thomas' actual writing on humility rather than its problematic Thomas' account of humility has in common with the virtues connected with it with the virtues of and it the of all our A and final clue humility even closer to justice, the they Thomas justice is political precisely because it our and This makes justice from the other moral virtues. The other moral virtues concern our with while justice our with is a virtue that our rational appetite while also In the where I about humility an integral part of a which quite to what Stanley Hauerwas has as an account of Humility an of a to in Stanley Hauerwas points out the and this of humility, in and of in ... of there and then in some by means one has already to hand if that includes and other of the will as a form of in a of lowly in so many of their and yet in their to an more of and this humility less a to for my over there and more a to our always already to and with the other even in the more in those well the of the those are and even those of with I am in in the and I this article with a critique of contemporary of Thomas' account of humility in the Summa. I am of these precisely because I am of Thomas' account of humility. Thomas' account is problematic because he philosophical ordering principles rather than disciplining his mind to in the that the whole of Christian teaching is If this is true and so little of Thomas' teaching is humility, then Thomas gives humility too modest a Yet there are in Thomas' moral vision that can be used to develop an alternative to his In this (Section I have a to humility as a part of In sum, because of the and of justice, humility can be thought of in to a of relevant contemporary such as and the flourishing of and political Of course this will also that one can only think of these properly when one has given to the of humility as reverence to Thomas that humility God and account of humility is – if – He humility as an infused moral virtue that all of human life into its (ST 2a2ae q161 It is not that Thomas even an for humility. Rather it seems of humility is, first and and it be for if humility out to have on the the of humility to are to in to many of the and political order of the in the end to There yet for the importance of humility in by to his – his I from of Thomas' the on the of on the of and on the I these because they help out of humility that seems to be in Thomas' of humility in the that humility is a for in This may seem Yet in the contemporary appropriations of Thomas' treatment of humility, is in this this the mind of Thomas and the of humility. ought to be by and to And to it to be so For so us to all he The of humility: in Thomas says that humility as an into the Christian This importance is through and through for John too humility in to And the Thomas humility's to Humility must be present in order to receive At that the to think is in the of And upon a little in the of And I say to be and as little not into the of therefore as this little in my receives It ought to be that humility And can this if is For as in pride there are two an and an of such is the in humility, because it does not about its it does not itself This to charity ... the more humility a man so much the more does he and the more he his the less he to and so the more charity a man the more humility he their and his and his place he to know what I have to me and and are for so I If I and have also ought to one For I have given an example, that also should as I have to the reason did this to give an so also ought to one because that what by this For when we are with the of has more than ... What one is a better of what is good than what one should be This is when says one and does another, what he does has more on than what he has ... Now the of a human not be for the human to because human reason into and it does in what it does into And so there given to us the of the of which be in and is for all is not if it is not by the on There is not in fact a single of virtue that the does not give to an of is than to give his life for his and did it on the ... And are for an of The most is on the ... an of at the One in The is because of the humility of There never humility so great as that of although He yet to and although He the yet to the form of a and, as St. and even into the For this He to be exalted even to and to the of for humility to in from these emphasize the importance of understanding for understanding the Christian virtue of humility. As we have thus far, without the of his other writing Thomas' with teaching and of humility can be This a more to the contemporary accounts of humility because it the which humility In his Thomas in on the of humility, the One is God and humility and He is its He is our in and exalted end in the Summa and the I there are many more from Thomas' writings that out this of humility. perhaps the most fecund alternative remain in his he the of the more than a and in his and his life he that which he Finally, it is to humility in the Summa in this although the Summa may have not given the virtue of humility its the of writing the Summa is itself an of humility. Thomas a of teaching to a more life teaching in to he the The Summa humility and it is an of humility. are of as and are parts of a as and are parts of and as the and powers are parts of the ... The potential parts of a virtue are the virtues connected with which are directed to certain secondary acts or matters, not having, as it were, the whole power of the principal There is in man great which he through the of and which to through the of magnanimity makes a man of great things in of the he from God ... the other humility makes a man think little of in of his If an of humility, look upon is although He He to be by and to be put to has as that of the of the us to a most The to for His the of the for Himself, even to the of the

Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Humility · Political science · Politics · Theology · Virtue · Catholicism and Religious Studies · Law · Medieval Philosophy and Theology · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil

• “We Ask Only That You Come to Us with an Open Heart and an Open Mind”

  Open Access•Tanja Hoffmann•Archaeologies of the Heart•2020

  Add to list

• Religious and Spiritual Salience, Well-Being, and Psychosocial Functioning Among Psychotherapy Clients

  Open Access•David R Paine, Steven J Sandage et al.•Journal of Religion and Health•2018

  Add to list

• The politics of humility

  Stephen Chatelier, L Jackson•Educational Philosophy and Theory•2022

  Add to list

• The Absolute Prohibition of Lying and the Origins of the Casuistry of Mental Reservation

  James Boyle•The American Journal of…•1999

  Add to list

• The Hauerwas Reader

  Stanley Hauerwas, Michael Cartwright et al.•Hauerwas Reader•2001

  Add to list