The Concept of Ergon

Towards an Achievement Interpretation of Aristotle’s ‘Function Argument’

Bibliographic Data

ID23201819
AuthorsSamuel Baker (0000-0001-9168-1523, corresponding author), Samuel H Baker
Year2015
Pages227-266
Publication date2015-06-04
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenueOxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume 48 (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherOxford University PressOxford (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198735540.003.0006
OpenAlexW2549208889
ISBN9780198735540
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited19

In Nicomachean Ethics 1.7, Aristotle gives a definition of the human good, and he does so by means of the ‘ergon argument’. This chapter clears the way for a new interpretation of this argument by arguing that Aristotle does not think that the ergon of something is always the proper activity (‘function’) of that thing. Though he has a single concept of an ergon, Aristotle identifies the ergon of an X as an activity in some cases but a product in others, depending on the sort of thing the X is — for while the ergon of the eye is seeing, the ergon of a sculptor is a sculpture. This alternative interpretation of Aristotle's concept of an ergon allows the key explanatory middle term of the ergon argument to be what it ought to be: ‘the best achievement of a human’.

Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Function (biology) · Interpretation (philosophy) · Linguistics · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Medicine · Philosophy

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