Damasio on mind and emotions
A conceptual critique
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23239649 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Brinkmann (0000-0001-7579-1212, corresponding author), Svend Brinkmann |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 366-380 |
| Publication date | 2006-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Nordic Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1901-2276 • E-ISSN: 1904-0016 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1027/1901-2276.54.4.366 |
| OpenAlex | W2106136665 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 7 |
Damasio’s theory of emotions and feelings has recently become influential in psychology and related disciplines. The theory states that feeling an emotion consists of having mental images that arise from neural patterns that represent changes in body and brain (and these changes make up the emotion). In this article, I first criticize Damasio’s general theory of the mind, before moving on to a critique of his theory of emotions. This critique involves four points. I argue that it is flawed to say (1) that we observe our feelings, (2) that feelings necessarily involve experiences of changes in body states, (3) that feelings are private, and (4) that feelings are always caused.
Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Feeling · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical, Religious, and Philosophical Studies · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,19 |
| Citation span | 2010 - 2022 (13) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |