Aristotle on Necessary Principles and on Explaining X through X’s essence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23240299 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Lucas Angioni (0000-0002-3265-5330, Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP), corresponding author) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Pages | 88-112 |
| Publication date | 2014-07-05 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Studia Philosophica Estonica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2228-110X • E-ISSN: 1736-5899 |
| Publisher | University of Tartu (PUBLISHER • EE) |
| DOI | 10.12697/spe.2014.7.2.06 |
| OpenAlex | W2107470213 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 8 |
I discuss what Aristotle means when he say that scientific demonstration must proceed from necessary principles. I argue that, for Aristotle, scientific demonstration should not be reduced to sound deduction with necessary premises. Scientific demonstration ultimately depends on the fully appropriate explanatory factor for a given explanandum. This explanatory factor is what makes the explanandum what it is. Consequently, this factor is also unique. When Aristotle says that demonstration must proceed from necessary principles, he means that each demonstration requires the principle that is the necessary one for the fully appropriate explanation of its explanandum. This picture also provides a key to understand Aristotle's thesis that scientific explanation depends on essences: it is the essence of the attribute to be explained (rather then the essence of the subject-term within the explanandum) that should be stated as the fully appropriate explanatory factor.
Epistemology · Subject (documents) · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Historical Philosophy and Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,22 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2019 (3) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |