Abstract + Concrete = Paradox
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23247906 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (0000-0003-2579-9966, Dartmouth College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Pages | 209-230 |
| Publication date | 2008-07-15 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | CHAPTER |
| Venue | Experimental Philosophy (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University PressNew York, NY (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/oso/9780195323252.003.0011 |
| OpenAlex | W3011016824 |
| ISBN | 9780195323252 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 15 |
Every area of philosophy is beset, bemused, and beguiled by paradoxes, which are riddles with good reasons for contrary answers and no expert or rational consensus on which answer is best (Sorensen 2003). Some paradoxes depend on curious examples, such as in the liar paradox. Others arise out of ordinary life. The former bother only philosophers, but the latter bother both philosophers and common folk. The latter, ordinary kind of paradox will be my topic here.
Epistemology · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
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| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2011 - 2026 (16) |
| Highly cited | No |