Pernicious Manipulation of Performance Measures in China's Cadre Evaluation System
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23317197 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jie Gao (0000-0002-9523-4541, National University of Singapore, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 223 |
| Pages | 618-637 |
| Publication date | 2015-09-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The China Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0009-4439 • E-ISSN: 1468-2648 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0305741015000806 |
| OpenAlex | W2152615523 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 55 |
| References cited | 19 |
The implementation of China's reform era target-based cadre evaluation system has instigated various types of gaming behaviour on the part of local officials. How do these gaming strategies differ from each other? Why do local officials sacrifice the public interest for target fulfilment in some cases but not in others? This article argues that gaming is not monolithic and should not be treated as such. It develops a typology that distinguishes between pernicious and benign gaming, and looks into the symptoms and motives of pernicious gaming in particular. It finds that the distinct design of the measurement system – the combination of result-oriented targets imposed from above and high-powered incentives for target fulfilment – induces pernicious gaming. In addition, the system's implementation practically compels local officials to misrepresent their performance, even though they are aware of the negative impact of such behaviour on the public interest. This study shows that to understand the strategies, motivations and implications of gaming better, a more nuanced approach is needed.
Business · China · Economics · Incentive · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Public relations · Sacrifice · Sociology · Typology · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Psychology · Public Policy and Administration Research
Playing with Time
Chinese Contemplations on Utopian and Dystopian Democratic Governance
Could campaign-style enforcement improve environmental performance? Evidence from China's central environmental protection inspection
Policy Feedback
Walking on thin ice
Mobilization and irregularity
Performance management and environmental governance in China
Seeking performance or control? Tethered party innovation in China’s performance evaluation system
The evolutionary mechanism of haze collaborative governance
Spatiotemporal heterogeneity of the association between socioeconomic development and health policy attention
Beyond GDPism
Elite Patronage and Firm Innovation in China
Performance feedback, blame avoidance, and data manipulation in the public sector
Unpacking the accountability cube and its relationship with blame avoidance
Accountability intensity and bureaucrats’ response to conflicting expectations
‘Profiting from at least one side’
Moving beyond gross domestic product
Politics and Planning
Running out of steam? A political incentive perspective of FDI inflows in China
Promotion vs. pollution
Democratic meritocracy based on virtue preselection and consent validation – political meritocracy meets electoral democracy
Using the Performance Evaluation System to Combat Corruption
Political Selection Institutions and Policy Performance
Building China’s Eldercare Market
Clientelism by Design
Political decentralization and the path-dependent characteristics of the state authoritarianism
Public-Private Partnerships in Home- and Community-Based Services for Older People in China
The mandate of “heaven”
Comparing the Effects of Changes in Performance Incentives and Implementation Activities on Policy Outcomes
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Sanctions on Local Government Officials
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How local governments prioritize multiple conflicting goals
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The tournament of Chinese environmental protection
Sword of Damocles hanging over grassroots cadres in China
Governing through ambiguity in the normalizing society
How does environmental pollution erode political trust in China? A multilevel analysis
Government size and citizen satisfaction in China
Personnel Control and Local Officials’ Attention to Economic Development
Pandemic control vs. economic recovery
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Enhancing or attenuating? How patronage ties moderate the impact of performance feedback on performance improvement in the public sector
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Data Manipulation through Patronage Networks
Capital Mobility and Taxation
Decentralization, local information, and effort substitution
Your Honey, My Poison
Studying the Chinese Policy Process in the Era of ‘Top-Level Design
Supervision by Public Opinion” or by Government Officials? Media Criticism and Central-Local Government Relations in China
"Watering-Down" Strict HIV Testing Quotas on Chinese Men Who Have Sex with Men Community-Based Organizations
Exploring the administrative mechanism of China's Paired Assistance to Disaster Affected Areas programme
The over-cascading system of cadre evaluation and China's authoritarian resilience
Reformed Migration Control and New Targeted People
The Cadre Evaluation System at the Grass Roots
On the unintended consequences of publishing performance data in the public sector
State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China
Between Separate Stoves and a Single Menu
Governing by goals and numbers
Uneven Policy Implementation in Rural China
Evaluation Processes, Local Cadres' Behaviour and Local Development Processes
What’s Measured Is What Matters
Gaming in Targetworld
Goal Displacement
Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China
The Institutional Logic of Collusion among Local Governments in China
| Citations per year | 6.11 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2017 - 2026 (10) |
| Highly cited | No |