The Affective Dog and Its Rational Tale
Intuition and Attunement
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23322151 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Peter Railton (0000-0002-7580-7891, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 124 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 813-859 |
| Publication date | 2014-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Ethics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0014-1704 • E-ISSN: 1539-297X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/675876 |
| OpenAlex | W1995987013 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 55 |
| References cited | 62 |
Intuition—spontaneous, nondeliberative assessment—has long been indispensable in theoretical and practical philosophy alike. Recent research by psychologists and experimental philosophers has challenged our understanding of the nature and authority of moral intuitions by tracing them to “fast,” “automatic,” “button-pushing” responses of the affective system. This view of the affective system contrasts with a growing body of research in affective neuroscience which suggests that it is instead a flexible learning system that generates and updates a multidimensional evaluative landscape to guide decision and action. With this latter view in mind, I revisit some of the classic hypothetical scenarios used in experimental moral psychology.
Action (physics) · Attunement · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Experimental philosophy · Intuition · Philosophical methodology · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Political Epistemology and Social Critique
Neuroethics
Debunking Arguments in Ethics
An empirical investigation of emotion and the criminal law
Transitive Inference over Affective Representations in Non-Human Animals
Cognitive Behavioural Virtue – how to Acquire Virtues
Affect Is at the Heart of Norm Psychology
Are emotions necessary and sufficient for moral judgement (and what would it tell us)
Moral encroachment and the ideal of unified agency
Reason and intuition in Aristotle's moral psychology
No need to get up from the armchair (if you’re interested in debunking arguments in metaethics)
How Did She Get So Good? On Virtue and Skill
Evolution is the source, and the undoing, of natural law
The valuationist model of human agent architecture
Moral intuition, strength, and metacognition
The mark of the moral
A (moderate) skill-based defense of the expertise defense
Virtue for affective engines
The ambivalent wisdom of moral disgust
Which moral exemplars inspire prosociality
Rational intuitions
Moral illusions
Ethnophilosophy as Decolonization
Teaching and learning
Explaining value
Analysis and Intuition Effectiveness in Moral Problems
The Varieties of Moral Vice
Magistrates, Mobs, and Moral Disagreement
Theism, Corporeal Finitudes, and the Science of Human Biases
Making Moral Judgments on Adequate Grounds
At least you tried
Perceptual learning and reasons‐responsiveness
Moral Experience
Can Moral Anti-Realists Theorize
Moral Testimony and Collective Moral Governance
Dissenter Protestantism and moral and social change
Are Intuitions Treated as Evidence? Cases from Political Philosophy
In Search of Greene's Argument
Valuing humane lives in two-level utilitarianism
Of trolleys and self-driving cars
Exploring the potential contributions of mindfulness and compassion-based practices for enhancing the teaching of undergraduate ethics courses in philosophy
Elizabeth Anderson interviewed by John White
Goldilocks conditions for workplace gamification
Letting Animals Off the Hook
Liberalism, polarization, and the aggregation problem
Intellectualizing know how
The Causal Map and Moral Psychology
When reasons run out
Unreliable emotions and ethical knowledge
The Empirical Identity of Moral Judgment
Making sense of the self
Between Critical and Normative Theory
Altruism and the Boundaries of Sanity
Evaluating the relationship between moral values and vaccine hesitancy in Great Britain during the Covid-19 pandemic
Moral perception
Kant
The Social Neuroscience of Empathy
Choices, Values, and Frames
Learning the value of information in an uncertain world
Deciding Advantageously Before Knowing the Advantageous Strategy
Person as scientist, person as moralist
The mismeasure of morals
From Is to Ought
Disgust
Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics
How (and where) does moral judgment work?
Self-projection and the brain
On Making the Right Choice
On the relationship between emotion and cognition
The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology
A Neural Substrate of Prediction and Reward
Pushing moral buttons
Mood as Information
Navigating Into the Future or Driven by the Past
The Goldilocks Effect
Origins and functions of positive and negative affect
Effect of subjective perspective taking during simulation of action
The emotional dog and its rational tail
Telling more than we can know
An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment
Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings
Responding to the emotions of others
The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice
Disgust sensitivity predicts intuitive disapproval of gays
Evolution, emotions, and emotional disorders
Prejudice reduction in white students
Mental state attributions and the side-effect effect
Morality in high definition
Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being
For whom do the ends justify the means? Social class and utilitarian moral judgment
On the malleability of automatic attitudes
Feeling and thinking
The unbearable automaticity of being
| Unique citing works | 55 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 5,5 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2026 (11) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 54 |