Appearance, Perception, and Non‐Rational Belief

In book 10 of the Republic we find a new argument for the partition of the soul. While similar in structure to the arguments in book 4, it centres on a purely cognitive conflict: believing and disbelieving the same thing, at the same time. The argument presents two interpretive difficulties. First, it assumes, without defence, that a conflict between a belief and an appearance — e.g. disbelieving that a partially immersed stick is, as it appears, bent — entails a conflict between beliefs. Second, it is unclear what the partition is between: some argue that it is between a rational and a non-rational part, others that it is a new partition within the rational part. This chapter offers solutions to these difficulties, paying close attention to what Plato means by ‘appearances’ (phainomena) and ‘beliefs’ (doxai). It is argued, first, that the relevant appearances are entirely sensory but nonetheless sufficiently belief-like to be called doxai and oppose, by themselves, our beliefs. A second claim concerns a central line in the argument, 602e4–6, that has served as the primary evidence that the partition is within the rational part. To avoid this conclusion, many have resorted to alternative, and less natural, translations of 602e4–6. It is argued that once we have correctly understood sensory appearances, we see that the standard translation in fact entails a division between a rational and non-rational part.

Cognitive psychology · Perception · Classical Antiquity Studies · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Neuroscience · Psychology · Social Psychology

• Plato’s ethics of belief

  Open Access•Eric C Brook, Eric Brook•Synthese•2025

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