Understanding the Demandingness Objection
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23598164 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David Sobel (0000-0001-6948-7046, Syracuse University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Pages | 220-237 |
| Publication date | 2020-10-08 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | CHAPTER |
| Venue | Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190905323.013.13 |
| OpenAlex | W3093456541 |
| ISBN | 9780190905323 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
My aim in this article is to help us understand and assess the Demandingness Objection to consequentialism. I first try to motivate the Objection. Then I consider traditional replies that consequentialists have offered in an attempt to undermine the force of the Objection. Next I argue that for the Objection to be successful, it must explain which costs are deemed especially demanding and which costs are not, and why morality should be thought to prioritize the former. I show that the Objection cannot function as a persuasive critique of Consequentialism without prioritizing some costs over others. Finally, I consider reasons to doubt that the Objection can successfully meet this challenge.
Consequentialism · Economics · Epistemology · Function (biology) · Law and economics · Morality · Utilitarianism · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Citations per year | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |